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Abstract. In a series of recent publications, orofacial researchers have debated the 
question of how ‘bruxism’ should be defined for the purposes of accurate 
diagnosis and reliable clinical research. Following the principles of realism-based 
ontology, we performed an analysis of the arguments involved. This revealed that 
the disagreements rested primarily on inconsistent use of terms, so that issues of 
ontology were thus obfuscated by shortfalls in terminology. In this paper, we 
demonstrate how bruxism terminology can be improved by paying attention to the 
relationships between (1) particulars and types, and (2) continuants and occurrents. 
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1. Introduction 
The exponential increase in the number of PubMed indexed papers that have ‘bruxism’ 
in their title suggest that it is not only patients who are being kept awake at night by the 
phenomenon of bruxism. But what is bruxism exactly? A consensus proposal was 
issued in 2013 by experts in the field to set matters straight [1]. In 2016, however, the 
lead author, after deliberation with other researchers, partly retracted the initial 
proposal [2], and this then led to a heated discussion with the other experts involved [3, 
4].  
The proposed consensus definition sees bruxism as ‘a repetitive jaw-muscle 
activity characterized by clenching or grinding of the teeth and/or by bracing or 
thrusting of the mandible’ [1, p2]. This definition was supplemented by a comment to 
the effect that: ‘Bruxism has two distinct circadian manifestations: it can occur during 
sleep (sleep bruxism) or during wakefulness (awake bruxism)’ [1, p2]. The definition 
was supplemented further by a ‘diagnostic grading system’, distinguishing ‘“possible”, 
“probable” and “definite” sleep or awake bruxism’ [1, p2]. It was this grading system 
which led to the retraction in [2]. This is because it was taken to imply that bruxism is a 
disorder rather than an activity (a type of behavior), the reason being that ‘Behavior 
alone is not diagnosed; disorders are’ [2, p791].  
The proposed consensus definition of bruxism as an activity had been advanced 
precisely in order to ‘move away from the concept of bruxism as an abnormality, as 
even a statistical abnormality is not a clinical abnormality unless it is clearly 
associated with a negative health outcome’ [2, p792]. Unfortunately, this was then in 
turn interpreted by the authors of [3] as a reason for contesting the retraction because, 
they held, it might be taken to imply a viewpoint ‘too strongly oriented towards the 
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definition of bruxism as a “behavior”’. The contestants’ held that ‘bruxism should not 
be categorically classified into either a disorder or a behavior or whatever else’ [3, 
p799]. Rather: ‘bruxism should be viewed as a “disorder”, viz. a condition that 
requires to be managed or prevented, only when it has consequences’ [3, p800]. This 
led the authors of [2] to believe that the primary issue raised against their views in [3] 
rested on ‘a semantic misunderstanding’ for which they then offered in [4, p. 802] this 
clarification: ‘Stating that (sleep) bruxism is a ‘“behavior” in no way precludes the 
possibility (at some to-be-specified and validated cut point) of it being more than a 
behavior, either a risk factor or disorder’ [4, p802].  
These discussions as to the nature of bruxism parallel similar debates pertaining to 
the nature of mental disorders. We thus hypothesize that a framework similar to the one 
developed for the latter in [5, 6] would allow the identification of confusions and 
conflations in the terminology of bruxism and provide a means to clearly identify the 
entities on the side of the patient that need to be addressed if confusions of the sorts 
illustrated in the above cited passages are to be prevented. 
2. Methodology 
We performed a discourse analysis of [1-4] in order to identify which later statements 
were made in response to which statements made in earlier papers. As a first step we 
attempted to identify where the terminology and phrasing used in statements combined 
in arguments within a single paper, or in chains of assertion and response across 
multiple papers, were suggestive of intrinsic ambiguities or non-intended 
interpretations. We then attempted to use the categories of entities defined in the Basic 
Formal Ontology (BFO) [7] and in the Ontology for General Medical Science (OGMS) 
[8] to identify the possible resolutions of these ambiguities and non-intended 
interpretations within a single carefully defined and logically consistent framework. 
Lastly, we tried to formulate what the experts had in mind in a way that follows closely 
the ontological and terminological principles set forth in [7, 8]. 
Consider, for example, the statement that ‘all bruxism forms may potentially be a 
phenomenon without any clinical consequences or a treatment/prevention-demanding 
disorder’ [3, p800]. This statement can be interpreted as reflecting the belief on the part 
of its authors that (a) bruxism is a subtype of phenomenon and (b) has at least two 
subtypes, namely (b1) bruxism without any clinical consequences and (b2) 
treatment/prevention-demanding bruxism, where (c) b1 is also a subtype of 
phenomenon without any clinical consequences, (d) b2 is a subtype of disorder, and (e) 
the subtypes (b1 and b2) distinguished in (c) and (d) are disjoint. The first problem here 
is that (a), (b), (d) and (e) are logically inconsistent (since no disorder is a 
phenomenon). A second problem is that expressions of the form ‘X without Y’ should 
only be construed as representing subtypes of X if the absence of Y implies a change in 
the pertinent X (‘smoking without tinnitus’ is not a special type of smoking) [9].  
3. Results 
Our analysis revealed that the authors of [4] are correct in arguing that the main cause 
of the objections raised in [3] is indeed ‘semantic misunderstanding’. But it revealed 
also that the main cause of the latter is the use of a jargon replete with terms not 
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precisely defined and often denoting constructs far removed from the reality that they 
are intended to describe. Thus we found that collections of unrelated entities are 
erroneously perceived as one single entity; that relationships are mistaken for entities in 
their own right; and that the verb ‘to be’ is used in ways that run together ontological 
relations expressed in natural language by means of constructions such as ‘X is a B’ or 
‘Xs are Bs’, which should more properly be seen as distinct. What most of the 
problems have in common is that the distinctions between particulars and types on the 
one hand, and continuants and occurrents on the other hand, are ignored. 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Ignoring the particular / type distinction in assertions 
A first problem is that the viewpoints expressed in [1-4] are all phrased as being about 
generic entities. Consider the assertions ‘Bruxism is a continuously distributed 
behavior’ [4, p802] and ‘Sleep Bruxism is best viewed as quantifiable activity 
occurring on a continuum’ [2, p795]. Here ‘bruxism’ is clearly used in the generic 
sense – thus the assertions are not about some specific patient’s bruxism. When the 
particular/type distinction is deployed along the lines formalized in BFO, then we can 
replace ‘is a’ with ‘subtype of ’ where it expresses a relation between types, and by 
‘instance of ’ where it expresses a relation between an instance and a type. We can then 
formulate statements such as: ‘John Doe’s repetitive jaw-muscle activity of last night 
instance of bruxism’, and this would allow us to infer from ‘bruxism subtype of 
behavior’ that John Doe’s repetitive jaw-muscle activity of last night is an instance of 
behavior. 
Although in [1-4] this distinction is not explicitly expressed, we are nonetheless 
confident that the authors are aware of the distinction and indeed that they strive to use 
expressions at the level of types to make assertions only concerning what must be true 
for all instances of those types. But then a difficulty arises with the assertion ‘Bruxism 
is a continuously distributed behavior [4, p802]. It is indeed hard to imagine that 
‘continuously distributed behavior’ would denote a type in the ontological sense, since 
it would entail that John Doe’s repetitive jaw-muscle activity of last night is an instance 
of Continuously Distributed Behavior. What could it mean for an individual behavior – 
thus one single entity – to be continuously distributed? The problem arises because the 
authors attempt at one and the same to classify particulars into types, and to classify 
types into supertypes, where the latter are special sorts of constructs references to 
which are used to assert how the instances of the relevant type are distributed (for 
example along a continuum). Unfortunately, they thereby, unwittingly, run together 
forms of speech governed by different logical rules. The resultant problems are familiar 
in the literature on the so-called ‘dimensionalist’ approach in psychiatry, where they 
have led advocates of this approach to argue that there is in fact only one type of 
mental disorder and that all particular mental disorders – such as John’s depression or 
Mary’s dementia – are merely instances of that one single type [6].  
What the experts seek to express is that Bruxism instances exhibit features which 
allow them to be ranked in a way reminiscent of how temperatures or heart rates of 
different people can be ranked, for example yesterday at 5pm John’s body temperature 
was 37.1°C, Mary’s was 37.6°C, Pete’s was 38.1°C, and so on. Observing the way in 
which temperature instances are distributed across sick and healthy people allows us to 
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set cut-off points for pathologically low, normal and high temperatures. A similar 
distinction can be made to group bruxism instances into subtypes, as in Figure 1. 
 
Pathological behavior
Bruxism
Bruxism without 
clinical consequences
Treatment/prevention
demanding bruxism
Behaviour
Normal behavior
Body temperature
Pathologically low
body temperature
Normal
body temperature
Pathologically high
body temperature
35.2°C BT 35.8°C BT 36.9°C BT… 37.2°C BT… … 38.9°C BT 40.2°C BT… …  
Figure 1. Types instantiated by particulars over which a partial ordering can be defined.  
4.2. Ignoring the distinction between continuants and occurrents 
Clearly, John’s body temperature can instantiate the types Normal and Pathologically 
Low/High Body Temperature at different times. Are Bruxism particulars such that they, 
similarly, can instantiate Bruxism Without Clinical Consequences at one time, and 
Treatment/Prevention Demanding Bruxism at another time? An analogue would be the 
case of a bent spine: John’s spine was fine until at some point in time it started to bend. 
From that point onwards, the spine became an instance not only of Spine but also of 
Bent Spine, and thus also of Disorder (in the OGMS sense). Can we, in a similar way, 
interpret ‘that (sleep) bruxism is a “behavior” in no way precludes the possibility of it 
being more than a behavior, either a risk factor or disorder’ [4, p802] as an assertion 
that a particular that is an instance of Behavior at one time can become an instance of 
Disorder at a later time, while still remaining an instance of Behavior? To see why this 
will not work, we need to pay attention to the continuant/occurrent distinction. 
Behavior instances are process occurrents: at every moment that they exist, they exist 
only partially as they unfold themselves in phases. An instance of Teeth Grinding has 
temporal parts which are movements of the jaw, now in one, now in another direction. 
These parts have further parts: smaller movements in a specific direction. All these 
parts are themselves process occurrents. Occurrents now cannot change because they 
are changes [10]. A process which is an instance of some process type cannot become 
an instance of another process type later on. Only continuants – e.g. material objects 
such as spines, and also enduring qualities such as temperature or height – can do so, as 
when an instance of Human Being changes from being an instance of Child to being an 
instance of Adult, while remaining an instance of Human Being.  
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Figure 2: Bruxism with a physiological and pathophysiological phase.  
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Figure 2 illustrates a better way to understand what is involved when an instance 
of bruxism changes from being harmless into being such as to require treatment or 
prevention. It does this by recognizing bruxism as a process composed out of other, 
smaller processes of different but related types. Of course, whether one would use 
‘bruxism’ to refer only to the whole larger process or also to the smaller pathological 
phase of that larger process, is something that bruxism experts need to agree upon. But 
this is a terminological choice; it does not impact the ontology as outlined here. 
5. Conclusion: getting our teeth into the heart of the bruxism matter 
There are two reasons why experts in a given scientific discipline can disagree about 
what to conclude from observations they all consider accurate: (1) the science in that 
domain is not yet sufficiently well developed, or (2) the associated terminology is ill-
defined or not consistently adhered to, so that what appear to be disagreements are in 
fact just beliefs about different portions of reality which are erroneously assumed to be 
the same. Although the bruxism experts themselves contend that (1) is the main source 
of problems, we believe that the fault lies primarily under (2). The next step is to 
reformulate all the assertions in [1-4] in a BFO-OGMS formalism that allows us to 
mimic the structure of reality in the bruxism domain along the lines outlined in [7, 8]. 
This would allow the experts to identify which views they hold within a framework 
which provides less room for ‘semantic misunderstanding’.  
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